Iran’s non-counter-revolution

by Jonathan on June 19, 2009

This policeman was lucky to esape with his life after being knocked off his motorbike whilst charging protestors. He was saved by men in the crowd who shielded him those who wanted to lynch him. The incident was captured on film here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8099857.stm

This policeman was lucky to esape with his life after being knocked off his motorbike whilst charging protestors. He was saved by men in the crowd who shielded him those who wanted to lynch him. The incident was captured on film here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8099857.stm

I have waited a bit before I commented on the Iran situation because as usual the media is pumping out Flat Earth News and the real situation there is actually extremely complicated.

As much as I would live to see the young liberals of Iran pull of a colour revolution, I think such an outcome may not serve genuine democracy.

It would appear that the Iran has a similar problem to Serbia in that the cities are dominated by reform seeking liberals, but the agrarian poor in the countryside support more radical and socialist/populist figures like Amajinadad (or Chavez or Milosevic).

As with Serbia, there is a generational element : the young want liberalisation and normalisation ; the old hanker for glory days past and support tyrants.http://richbyrne.blogspot.com/2009/06/iran-and-serbia-part-ii.html

This Stratfor video is informative and refreshing in its lucid heterodoxy:

The Serbia -Iran link has not been lost on some anti-US /Pro-Serb bloggers. Here is Nebojsa Malic:

Normally I wouldn’t comment on Iran; what happens there is none of my business. But the whole post-election mess there has me wondering.

You see, it looks very much like a “color revolution” scenario: the US-favored candidate contests election results, claims victory, and his supporters riot till the government caves in. But then, couldn’t the incumbent actually steal the election knowing full well that he can paint the resulting opposition protests as a CIA/NED coup attempt, whether that is actually true or not?

I freely admit that I haven’t a clue what’s actually true in the reports coming from Iran, whether Ahmadinejad or Mousavi actually won the vote, who stole what (or not). Given the track record of the mainstream Western media when it comes to the Balkans (as a rule, their reports are almost entirely false), why should I believe anything they say about Iran? Especially since the Empire is so determined to have a war with Tehran, one way or another.

The fact remains, however, that the technique of “democratic coup” pioneered by the Empire in Serbia – and applied elsewhere since – has made it effectively impossible to judge whether any election, anywhere, is actually legitimate. Even if we somehow possessed the knowledge to make an informed decision, there is still the matter of the Empire insisting that democracy is whatever it says it is. As a consequence, “democracy” has become just about meaningless. And that, regardless of what happens in Iran, is something definitely worth thinking about…

http://grayfalcon.blogspot.com/2009/06/persian-puzzle.html

Daniel Larison writing in the American Conservative, and linked to by Malic above:

The pre-election hype was that the opposition candidate was enjoying a surge in support in the final weeks and stood a chance of forcing a run-off, if not actually beating the incumbent outright. Then, amid record-high turnout, the incumbent won handily and the opposition complained that it had been robbed. In other words, the hype in Lebanon was just hype and was shown to be such on election day, whereas it was God’s own truth in Iran. As the Leveretts argue in Politico today, Ahmadinejad’s official percentage of the vote is very close to his 2005 total against Rafsanjani. As it happens, this is true. Of course, this result was from the head-to-head run-off between two candidates, rather than the multi-candidate first round, but it is not necessarily impossible that a comparable percetange of a larger electorate backed Ahmadinejad in the first round as turnout increased. This does not rule out the use of fraud. Fraud may have been widespread as well, but what we do not know as yet is how significant the effect of this fraud was.

Given all of this, the readiness with which almost everyone in the West seems to be accepting the “coup” explanation is rather worrisome. It is similar to the lockstep consensus on the “Iraqi threat” six years ago that made war all but inevitable, and it is similar to our political class’ certainty last year that Georgia was merely an innocent victim of “Russian aggression,” which has been found again and again to be false. The “coup” in Iran is becoming one of those things that “everyone knows,”

We know this as Flat Earth News.

…and as we have seen more than a few times in the past the things that “everyone knows” are not always true. Moreover, this thing that “everyone knows” about the Iranian election is based on partial, sketchy and biased information–sound familiar? There may be elements of the “coup” story that hold up under scrutiny. It is true that the Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia are loyal to Ahmadinejad and had a significant role in all of this, but how much of that role was illegal under Iranian law remains to be seen.

Part of the “coup” argument is that America must not side against the Iranian people, and it is taken for granted that the people are on Mousavi’s side, because Mousavi’s claims of representing the majority are taken at face value and Mousavi’s side is sometimes simply identified as the side of The People. Were the situation reversed and Ahmadinejad supporters were the ones rioting, it is all but certain that no one would believe a word of their complaints. It is being called fascism when the police attack pro-Mousavi protesters, but you know that it would also be called fascism if it were Ahmadinejad’s people rioting in the streets rather than Mousavi’s, even if the positions of the two candidates were reversed exactly and their actions were identical. (Of course, if Mousavi were the incumbent, he might very well win, because no incumbent has ever lost in any Iranian presidential election–why exactly do we think that anything has changed this time?) If Ahmadinejad’s supporters were the ones in the streets, we would hear all about how they need to accept defeat and acknowledge the validity of the election, and if they refused to do so they would be charged with subverting the democratic process.

The “coup” argument is a consensus view that fits a lot of existing prejudices, allows us to reaffirm pleasant myths about the virtues of popular government (which we are supposed to believe would have yielded a good result, were it not for those meddling fraudsters), and provides an excuse for moralistic posturing in which we get to flaunt our enthusiasm for democracy mostly for our own satisfaction. I am increasingly skeptical that it describes the events of the last few days.

http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2009/06/16/elections/

So now the Grand Ayatollah has spoken, and denounced the protests, we will see if this coup has any genuine back-bone.

Could see another Tienanmen Square, this time in Tehran, with protesters brutally oppressed? I think we are more likely to see the protests fizzle than explode.

Ironically, a heavy handed response to the protests might actually legitimise them and turn people against the government even though the original election was probably fair.

Here are the scenarios the WSJ has listed:

  • People power prevails.
  • Mr. Ahmadinejad survives, by taking a moderate position.
  • The forces of repression win within Iran, causing a backlash from the rest of the world.
  • The protests are simply crushed by Ali Khamenei; repression intensifies.
  • Ahmadinejad wins a recount or runoff, victorious but drastically weakened.
  • Mousavi somehow prevails, and rules with an unknown agenda and in a standoff with the rest of the Iranian elite.

I do not think we are seeing people power. I think we are seeing urban elites lending the appearance of people power.

I suspect that this situation in Iran may well be the same as Serbia in the 90’s. Not many people know that throughout the 90’s the Milosevic regime faced massive daily demonstrations by students, democrats and liberals – mostly the young.  They were brutally oppressed and did not success for over a decade, but eventually they did.

I do not think that these demonstrators will unseat the Mullahs this time around. They will tire or be beaten into submission, but I do think this is the beginning of the end for Islamic Republic.

Whatever happens, this should be an interesting weekend.

See Also:

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The beginning of the end for the Iranian regime? — LimbicNutrition Weblog
June 24, 2009 at 3:40 pm

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Kieran June 20, 2009 at 1:56 pm

Good post.

I’m not convinced people from the West have entirely moved to support the opposition (although I admit most would). Rather, I think a large part of it is simply Western Media doing what they do best – spinning a story. In this case they are supporting the ‘underdog’, something we tend to do.

This has dramatic consequences on foreign perceptions, and I am sure it rattles other nations mightily! We are used to this behaviour from the media, and we accept it. We are generally ok with it happening and consider it par for the course – whilst we try to make up our own minds.

Other nations with less freedom of speech in their press probably have a hard time understanding this. As a consequence they believe we all think the same way.

I would appreciate Clinton or Obama making some claim of neutrality and acknowledging a lack of evidence. In fairness, I think Obama simply encouraged freedom of speech during these times. This is not necessarily an endorsement of the opposition. Again, difficult for the Iranian regime to understand this

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